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RESEARCH STATEMENT

My primary research fields are **Labor Economics**, **Organization Economics** and **Applied Microeconometrics**. My research focuses on workforce related productivity determinants across sectors. It is well-established in the literature that significant productivity differentials within countries (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008) and specific industries (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Smith and Watts, 1992; and Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984), which are not attributable to production factors. In my Ph.D. dissertation I study organization productivity and its connection to management quality and intangible labor inputs, such as motivation and information, in private, public or non-profit sectors. I use a combination of panel data analysis and experimental methodology.

My job market paper focuses on analysing the relationship between CEO quality and firm productivity in the private sector using CEO job transitions. On a separate working paper I study on the impact of providing non-financial incentives in harnessing prosocial behavior in the nonprofit sector. Lastly, another working paper studies the mechanisms driving a rise in emergency room visits in a central Hospital in Portugal by taking advantage of a natural experiment in legislation.

WORKING PAPERS

In my **job market paper** I address the link between CEO quality and firm productivity in a setting where firm choices are assumed to be governed by a Cobb-Douglas production function with the traditional inputs (labor and capital), a firm-specific technology and a certain quality level that is unique to the CEO. This quality enters the production function as an interaction with total factor productivity of the firm, over whose inputs the CEO as a limited control (Lucas, 1978). Using a proxy measure for CEO quality estimated as a person fixed effect, identified by CEO job transitions, I evaluate the role of CEO quality in firm productivity. The novelty of my approach is that I use the time period before the CEO has assumed that role so as to avoid the potentially confounding effects of endogenous CEO mobility, for which I find evidence in the data. I find that a one standard deviation increase in CEO quality translates into a 5% increase in firm productivity. I complement the analysis of the CEO-firm relationship by expanding the model to allow for (i) endogenous mobility on a specific wage realization and (ii) a role for CEO-firm match complementarities in firm production. I use a random effects model with discrete heterogeneity on both CEO and firm sides. I find the significant impact of CEO-firm complementarities in production. A counterfactual exercise, in which I randomly assign CEOs to firms, I find that significant complementarities between CEO and firm heterogeneity which play an important role in determining firm productivity (2-3% difference in average productivity).

In two **separate working papers**, I study the impact of introducing non-financial incentives on prosocial behavior in the nonprofit sector. This project includes a finished lab experiment and a projected field experiment with a large international NGO: in the **lab experiment**, I randomize the introduction of five different non-financial incentives in a real effort task, which volunteers know

reverts to a well-known nonprofit. Each non-financial incentive intends to match a specific type of intrinsic motivation, as described in Bénabou & Tirole (2003). After knowing which non-financial incentive was assigned to them, subjects decide on (i) whether to participate as a volunteer and (ii) how much -in time- to participate. I find that the likelihood to contribute as a volunteer is greater when the subject is assigned to the incentive she most prefers (exact matching). Moreover, time donated is also greater under exact matching between incentives and motivations. Results suggest that incentives targeting motivation related to identification with the cause are the most effective in increasing productivity, whereas those concerning perceived tangible (monetary) rewards are less effective. These conclusions have some limitations which I discuss in the paper, the most important of which being the lack of dynamics in the decision making process, since the real effort task presented is a one-shot event. Most of the limitations can be addressed in a **field experiment**. I design a randomized control trial which assigns volunteers working at OXFAM Spain's fair trade shops to four alternative groups, each corresponding to a different incentive scheme. The warm glow incentive group participant is given detailed information about her specific contribution to OXFAM's mission. The pecuniary incentive group is given a prize in the form of a bundle of OXFAM shop's high-end products. Lastly, the social image group is rewarded with a public thank you message on social networks, visible to the participants' relevant social network.

A separate **working paper**, joint with Pedro Pita Barros, studies the an unexpected and unprecedented 8% increase in emergency room visits in a central Hospital in Portugal (HSM) by taking advantage of a natural experiment in legislation. The new law lead to a change in the geographical areas of primary care units, resulting in conflicting information for patients. The novelty of the paper lies in using ALERT system data on the seriousness of the emergency room (ER) episode to infer drivers of emergency affluence. We conduct a demand curve estimation for ER visits is estimated along with other econometric models that explain users' behaviour when resorting to the ER. We evaluate the impact of the redrawing of the geographical area covered by HSM as an origin for ER cases. Finally, we study of repeated use of the ER and its interaction with demographics, namely age and episode gravity. Results show that there is an upward trend in daily episodes, whose bulk stems for less serious cases or ones that could be treated in primary care facilities. The HSM plays a role where internal structure is concerned. However, population and health system features appear as the important drivers of changes in ER turnout.

FUTURE WORK

In aim to further pursue the research initiated in my doctoral thesis work in three key directions.

1. As an extension of my job market paper, I plan to develop and structurally estimate a model that accounts for effort elicitation in the presence of moral hazard as key features of the match between CEO and firm. Moreover, I plan to use available data on managerial practices (World Management Survey) to further study possible mechanisms through which unobserved quality of the CEO influences organizational outcomes.
2. Regarding my experimental work, I plan to implement the already designed field experiment after an ongoing organisational restructuring at OXFAM. This avenue of research, concerning the role of non-financial incentives in the nonprofit sector, has important spillovers for the analysis of private sector contract theory, as suggested by the observed trend in workplaces that provide wholesome incentive packages.
3. I have a particular interest in understanding workforce related determinants of project effectiveness and survival. In line with this topic, I am currently studying the role of young and high educated workforce in improving firms' abilities to weather recessions.